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Notes and Comments
Dirks v. SEW. New Guidelines for Tippee
Liability under Rule 10b-5
I. Introduction
In Dirks v. SEC,' the Supreme Court held that a tippee,'
when trading in securities, may knowingly use material,4 non-
1. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
2. The term "tippee" is used in Dirks to refer to "recipients of inside information."
Id. at 3263. Accord In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 635 (1971) (defining
tippees as persons "other than corporate insiders who receive nonpublic corporate infor-
mation"). See infra note 6 for the definition of an insider.
3. Tippee liability for insider trading "is imposed only in circumstances where the
tippee knows, or has reason to know, that the insider has disclosed improperly inside
corporate information." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264 n.19. Accord Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 701-02 (1980). One of the conditions that determines culpability for inside trading is
"the requirement that the violator must know, or at least have reason to know, that the
information he is exploiting is not publicly available." Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAuv. L. Rzv. 322,
367 (1979).
The Dirks Court required that a tippee know or should know that an insider has
breached his fiduciary duty before imposing insider trading liability on the tippee. Dirks,
103 S. Ct. at 3264. Later in the majority's opinion, however, the Court indicated that
scienter is only a relevant element in some cases of tippee liability. Id. at 3265. The
Court defined scienter as "'a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.'" Id. at 3265 n.23 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12
(1976)).
4. The test developed by the Supreme Court to determine whether information is
material is if "the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasona-
ble investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also In re Faberge, Inc.,
45 S.E.C. 249, 255 (1968); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C.
933, 937 (1968). Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)
("All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasona-
ble investor might have considered them important in the making of [his] decision.").
The fact that inside information is used to trade has been held to constitute a clear
indication that such information was material. See, e.g., In re Investors Management
Co., 44 S.E.C. at 646.
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public5 information that he receives from an insider6 in a corpo-
5. "Information is nonpublic when it has not been disseminated in a manner making
it available to investors generally." In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 643.
See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
noma., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (In order for information to be considered
public it "must have been effectively disclosed in a manner sufficient to insure its availa-
bility to the investing public."); In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. at 256 ("Proper and ade-
quate disclosure . . . can only be effected by a public release through the appropriate
public media, designed to achieve a broad dissemination to the investing public generally
and without favoring any special person or group.").
In Dirks, the Court noted, with approval, the definition of nonpublic information
developed in In re Faberge, Inc. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260 n.12 (quoting In re Faberge,
Inc., 45 S.E.C. at 256). In addition, the Dirks Court explained that the public disclosure
requirement does not impose an obligation simply to tell the SEC about fraud before
trading. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265 n.21.
6. The term "insiders" has been applied to officers, directors, and employees who
"almost by definition have a degree of knowledge that makes them culpable if they trade
on inside information." SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 941 (2d Cir. 1979). See also
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) ("An affirmative duty to disclose
material information has been traditionally imposed on corporate 'insiders,' particularly
officers, directors, or controlling stockholders.").
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912, and SEC v. Monarch Fund, 908 F.2d at
942, suggest that "tippees" are considered "insiders" under certain circumstances. See
infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
Dirks distinguishes insiders from tippees by noting that insiders "have independent
fiduciary duties to both the corporation and its shareholders [while] the typical tippee
has no such relationship." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261. Certain outsiders, however, may be
treated as insiders where the outsider has entered into a special confidential relationship
with a corporation that expects the outsider to keep disclosed nonpublic information
confidential and the outsider's relationship with the corporation implies a nondisclosure
duty. Id. at 3261 n.14.
While § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), and
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), promulgated thereunder, do not explicitly men-
tion insiders, the term is narrowly defined for purposes of § 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Section 16(b) requires a statutory insider
to surrender any profit realized by him for any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase of
any equity security made within a six month period. Id. For purposes of § 16(b), a statu-
tory insider is a "beneficial owner, director or officer" of the corporation. Id. A "benefi-
cial owner" is defined as one who owns "more than 10 per centum of any class of equity
security." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
Additionally, the SEC has adopted Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983), promul-
gated under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), which
defines persons liable for trading on nonpublic information concerning a tender offer.
Section 14(e) makes the use of manipulative, deceptive, or fraudulent practices "in con-
nection with tender offers" unlawful. Rule 14e-3 applies § 14(e) to persons: (1) who
know, or who have reason to know, that a tender offer is imminent; and (2) who derive
this knowledge, directly or indirectly, from the officers, directors, or employees of the
offering company or the target company or from others, acting for the offering company
or the target company. For a discussion of the infirmities in Rule 14e-3, see Heller,
Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW.
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ration as long as the insider does not personally benefit from
supplying this information to the tippee. The Court relied on
the principle established in Chiarelia v. United Statess that a
special relationship, based on common law fiduciary principles,
must exist before trading on inside information constitutes a vi-
olation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.'
In Dirks, the Court determined that where the recipient of
inside information has no pre-existing fiduciary duty to the
shareholders, he does not automatically inherit the insider's
duty to disclose or abstain.10 The tippee's disclosure duty is de-
rived from the insider's duty." The insider must breach his
fiduciary duty to the shareholders before a derivative breach can
be attributed to the tippee.1'
The new guidelines set forth in Dirks will be important to
the investment community, because they delineate the circum-
stances under which a tippee may be held liable under section
10(b) 13 and Rule 10b-514 for trading on material, nonpublic in-
517, 541-46 (1982). See generally Pelosa & Krause, Trading on Inside Information, 14
Rav. Szc. Racs. 941 (1981).
7. The test to determine if an insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders by supplying the tippee with confidential information is "whether the insider
personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at
3265.
8. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
9. Dirks, 103 S. Ct at 3261.
10. Id. at 3261-62.
11. Id. at 3264.
12. Id.
13. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or any facility of
any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
14. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
3
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formation. Before Dirks, the policy of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) was to charge a tippee with inside
trading because the tippee knowingly received and profited from
inside information. 15 As a result of Dirks, tippee liability cannot
be imposed unless the source of the information, the insider, re-
ceived a benefit from supplying the information, thereby breach-
ing his fiduciary duty to the shareholders."0 Additionally, the
tippee must have been aware, or had reason to be aware, of the
insider's breach.'1 Consequently, the decision in Dirks increases
the evidentiary burden on the SEC and limits the scope of tip-
pee liability for insider trading.
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
Rule 10b-5 was referred to throughout Dirks as the statutory basis for the SEC's
insider trading rule because "Rule 10b-5 is generally the most inclusive of the three pro-
visions on which the SEC rested its decision in this case." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260 n.11.
This Casenote will similarly refer to Rule 10b-5 as the statutory basis for the SEC's
insider trading rules.
15. See Brief of SEC in Opposition, Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available from
U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Pub. No. 383646-1144 (1982)).
The term "inside information" refers to material, nonpublic information. See supra
notes 4-6. The Court in Dirks rejected the SEC's attempt to distinguish Chiarella from
Dirks because Chiarella involved "market information" while Dirks involved "inside in-
formation." The Court noted "'that § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by their terms and by their
history make no such distinction.'" Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262 n.15 (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 240 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
In Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger noted that academic writing has distinguished
"market information" from "corporate information." "Market information" refers to
knowledge about circumstances or events that affect the "market" for securities; while
"corporate information" denotes information concerning a company's assets or earning
power. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 240 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Brudney, supra note 3, at 329-33; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
Into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 798, 799
(1973).
The term insider trading is a misnomer when applied to a tippee or an outsider
since the Court distinguishes between trading done by an insider as opposed to a non-
insider. Therefore, this Casenote will make a distinction between insider trading and
inside trading. Insider trading will be used to refer to trading where the trader who is in
possession of nonpublic, material information is a traditional insider. In contrast, inside
trading will denote trading by an outsider or a tippee. For the definitions of tippee and
insider, see supra notes 2 & 6.
16. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
17. Id.
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Part II of this Casenote discusses the facts in Dirks and the
development of the duty under Rule 10b-5 to publicly disclose
material, inside information or to abstain from trading in the
security. Part III presents the majority and the dissenting opin-
ions in Dirks. Part IV analyzes the reasoning in the decision and
considers its impact on the future enforcement of the disclose or
abstain rule. Part V concludes that the "insider's personal gain
test" will not significantly narrow the scope of tippee liability for
inside trading if it is broadly construed by the courts.
II. Background
A. The Law Before Dirks: Development of the Disclose or Ab-
stain Rule
Courts have emphasized that the legislative purpose behind
the federal securities laws was to achieve a high standard of bus-
iness ethics in the securities industry by replacing the philoso-
phy of caveat emptor with a philosophy of full disclosure. 8 Ac-
cordingly, the SEC requires that material, inside information"9
be publicly disseminated before one can trade on the basis of
this information. This prohibition against insider trading has be-
come known as the disclose or abstain rule.20
The development of the disclose or abstain rule is a product
of judicial and administrative construction of the general anti-
fraud"' provisions of the federal securities laws." Specifically,
18. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Cf. In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961) ("A significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to
eliminate the idea that the use of inside information for personal advantage was a nor-
mal emolument of corporate office.").
See generally Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of
Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809, 812 (1968)
("A major purpose of the federal securities laws was to correct [the] deficiency in state
corporation laws.").
19. See supra notes 4-5 for a definition of material, inside information.
20. See Brudney, supra note 3, at 322-23.
21. "'Fraud . . . properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which in-
volve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are
injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another.'" SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 194 (quoting Moore
v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122, 128 (1889)).
22. For example, see supra notes 13-14 for the texts of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
infra note 98 for the text of § 17(a).
1984]
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section 10(b) 23 has been characterized as a "'catchall clause to
prevent manipulative devices.' '"24 Rule 10b-5, promulgated
under section 10(b), prohibits "any person" from using "any de-
vice" that defrauds "any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. '2 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prohibit inside trading only in so far as it constitutes fraud.2 6
Recognizing the restricted definition given to fraud at common
law, 7 the judiciary developed an expanded definition of fraud
for the purpose of section 10(b).28
1. Common law fiduciary duty and the special facts
doctrine
Under the common law, failure to disclose material informa-
tion does not constitute fraud unless the informed party is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care because of his fiduciary rela-
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See supra note 13 for the text of § 10(b).
24. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (quoting Thomas G. Cor-
coran, a spokesman for the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Hearings on
H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). See supra note 14 for the text of Rule 10b-5. Rule
10b-5 was written specifically for the purpose of addressing a misuse of inside informa-
tion. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32. For an account of the cir-
cumstances under which Rule 10b-5 was written, see Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
26. The SEC did not specifically address the issue of nondisclosure when Rule 10b-5
was promulgated in 1942. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). See Hel-
ler, supra note 6; Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALF. L. REV. 1 (1982).
27. Under the common law principle of fraud, there is no general duty to disclose
material information in an "arms length" commercial transaction. W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 695-96 (4th ed. 1971).
28. See generally Brudney, supra note 3. Brudney proposed that the disclose and
abstain rule should prohibit trading where one party has an informational advantage
that public investors may not lawfully overcome, regardless of their diligence or re-
sources. Brudney reasoned that the congressional intent behind the securities laws was
"to protect not merely those dealing with corporate insiders (and their tippees) but pub-
lic investors generally against a variety of frauds by others, including exploitation of
institutional informational advantages that they were unable to compete away." Id. at
357. Brudney concluded that even if the language of the legislature does not require such
a broad disclosure duty, "its history suggests that in its effort to restore faith in the
securities market, Congress concluded that such informational advantages should be de-
nied." Id. But see Jennings, supra note 18, at 815. Jennings insisted that "to determine
the scope and application of Rule 10b-5, one must first establish whether or not a fiduci-
ary relationship exists between the parties to the purchase or sale." Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/5
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tionship with the other party.29 The "special facts" doctrine, de-
veloped in Strong v. Repide,30 declared that even if the relation-
ship between corporate directors and shareholders was not of
such a fiduciary nature as to give rise to an affirmative disclosure
duty under traditional common law principles, "there are cases
where, by reason of special facts, such a duty exists."31 The rule
developed that corporate directors, officers, 2 and controlling
stockholders,3 3 as fiduciaries of minority shareholders, owed an
affirmative disclosure duty. Corporate insiders breached this
fiduciary duty by using inside information for their personal ad-
vantage.34 While subsequent cases ostensibly based the disclos-
ure duty on either a fiduciary relationship or the "special facts"
doctrine,35 the theory developed that the fraud in inside trading
derives from the "inherent unfairness" of exploiting one's infor-
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 695-97; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
551(2)(a) & comment a (1977). See generally Note, United States v. Newman: Misap-
propriation of Market Information By Outsiders, 3 PACE L. REv. 311, 314-15 (1983)
(discussing common law fraud in relation to Rule lOb-5). See supra note 21 for the defi-
nition of fraud.
30. 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The four
parties involved in Kardon each owned a one-fourth interest in two corporations. After
the two defendants agreed to sell one of the corporations to an outsider, the defendants
purchased all the plaintiffs' stock in the two corporations. Id. at 800-01. The court held
that a proportionate share of the plaintiffs' profit should be restored because the defen-
dants were officers and directors of the corporation and breached their duty by selling to
an outsider "without disclosing the transaction to the plaintiffs or giving them an oppor-
tunity to participate in it." Id. at 802. The court reasoned that "[tihe broad terms of the
[Securities and Exchange] Act [of 1934] are to be made effective in a case like the pre-
sent one through application of well known and well established equitable principles
governing fiduciary relationships." Id. at 803.
33. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951). The court
held that the defendant corporation was under a duty to minority shareholders of a sec-
ond corporation which it controlled, to disclose the second corporation's increased earn-
ings and the increased value of its inventory, in light of the defendant's plan to purchase
the minority shareholders' stock in the second corporation. Id. at 828-31. The court rea-
soned that "[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ...
was to outlaw the use of inside information by corporate officers and principal stockhold-
ers." Id. at 829.
34. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1446-47 (2d ed. 1961) ("Under the ... 'fidu-
ciary' rule . . . corporate insiders are held to fiduciary standards in their dealings with
stockholders and hence must make full disclosure of all material facts.").
35. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. at 829.
1984]
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mational advantage.3 6
2. Expanding the disclosure duty: the special relationship
test
In the seminal case on inside trading liability, In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 37 the Commission extended the disclosure duty
beyond the common law concept by construing Rule 10b-5 as
creating a duty of disclosure between persons who did not have
a traditional fiduciary relationship. 38 The Commission held a
tippee 39 liable for inside trading, because he sold securities on
the basis of nonpublic information received from an insider. 0
The Commission reasoned that since the insider's relationship to
the company clearly prohibited him from exploiting his position
by profiting from inside information, "[b]y logical sequence, it
should prohibit [the tippee], a partner of the registrant from
[doing the same thing]. 41
36. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983) (citing In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968) (fraud derives from "inherent
unfairness")).
37. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
38. Id. at 912. "[Tlhe anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of 'any person' and
a special obligation has been traditionally required of corporate insiders, e.g., of-
ficers, directors and controlling stockholders. These three groups, however, do not ex-
haust the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation." Id. Cady, Roberts,
held that Gintel, a registered representative, violated Rule lob-5 when he traded while in
possession of nonpublic, inside information that he received from a director in the
corporation.
39. See supra notes 2 & 6 for the definitions of tippee and insider. In Cady, Roberts,
the Commission does not actually refer to Gintel as a tippee since this term is not used
until subsequent cases.
40. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 917-18.
41. Id. at 912. The Commssion in Cady, Roberts cites 3 L. Loss, supra note 34, at
1450-51, and RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 201(2) (1937), as authorities for assigning
insider duty to Gintel, a tippee.
Loss states that tippees should be held liable under Rule lob-5 when they knew,
or at least reasonably should have inferred, that an insider's tip was a "breach of
trust." . . . Under the expanding concepts of fair dealing between corporate 'in-
siders' and stockholders, the courts would need little more excuse than the doc-
trine in the law of restitution: "Where a fiduciary in violation of his duty to the
beneficiary communicates confidential information to a third person, the third
person, if he had notice of the violation of duty, holds upon a constructive trust
for the beneficiary any profit which he makes through the use of such
information."
3 L. Loss, supra note 35, at 1451 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 201(2)
.(1937)).
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In Cady, Roberts, the Commission reasoned that since the
anti-fraud provisions are phrased in terms of "any person," the
disclosure obligation extends beyond traditional insiders such as
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. 42 The Commis-
sion held that the disclosure duty rests on two principal
elements:
[Flirst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a cor-
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.43
Therefore, the disclosure duty attaches to "persons. . . in a spe-
cial relationship with a company and privy to its internal af-
fairs" and is based on "inherent unfairness."" The Commission
did not delineate the circumstances under which a person who is
not a director, officer, or controlling shareholder, but who has
access to inside information, could be held liable for trading
while in possession of inside information. As a result, its decision
was unclear as to whether mere "access" to confidential informa-
tion created a "special relationship." Therefore, the question left
unresolved by Cady, Roberts was whether mere "access" to con-
fidential information, evidenced by a person's trading while in
possession of inside information, established a sufficient "special
relationship" to trigger the disclosure duty.
42. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912. In rejecting any distinction between
sellers and purchasers under Rule 10b-5, the Commission stated:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an
officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders
from whom he purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is
clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts
embodied in the securities acts.
Id. at 913-14. The Commission justified extending the scope of insider liability by noting
that the securities laws "are broad remedial provisions aimed at reaching misleading or
deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient to sus-
tain a common law action for fraud and deceit." Id. at 910. This principle, that a fiduci-
ary relationship exists between insiders and purchasers of their corporation's securities,
was noted with approval in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980).
43. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912.
44. Id.
19841
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3. The "possession" test
The expansion of the disclose or abstain duty beyond the
traditional common law concepts was given judicial imprimatur
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co..' 5 The court held company
officials and employees liable under Rule 10b-5 for purchasing
shares in the company while in possession of reliable, nonpublic
information that the company had made a successful copper
strike.' The court refrained from determining whether the dis-
closure duty was predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts or
on the "special facts" doctrine.47 Instead, the court emphasized
that "Rule [10b-5] is based on the justifiable expectation . . .
that all investors . . . have relatively equal access to material
information." 4 The court expanded the scope of inside trading
liability by omitting the "special relationship" requirement set
forth in Cady, Roberts and imposing a disclosure duty on "any-
one in possession of material inside information.""' In dicta, the
45. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
46. Id. at 864.
47. Id. at 848.
48. Id. The court stated that "[t]he core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the
congressional purpose that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of par-
ticipation in securities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the
investing public should be subject to identical market risks .... " Id. at 851-52. Accord
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
49. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. After Texas Gulf Sulphur,
some courts adopted the "possession" test. See, e.g., Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752
(9th Cir. 1973); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972).
But see General Time Corp. v. Tally Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
Numerous authors have interpreted Texas Gulf Sulphur as expanding the scope of
inside trading liability beyond the common law fiduciary principles. Referring to Texas
Gulf Sulphur, Langevoort states: "[T]he court found it unnecessary to determine pre-
cisely who had been defrauded, apparently assuming that a fraud 'on the martketplace'
was enough to support an SEC injunctive action." Langevoort, supra note 26, at 9. Jen-
nings cites Texas Gulf Sulphur to support the principle that under Rule 10b-5 the Com-
mission is not required to prove common law elements of fraud. Jennings, supra note 18,
at 817. See also Comment, Insider Trading-The Extension of the Duty to Disclose
Material Inside Information, 58 NoTr DAME LAw. REv. 132, 135 (1982) ("Texas Gulf
Sulphur's reasoning, in effect, extended the duty beyond those in confidential relation-
ships with a corporation to anyone possessing material inside information."); Comment,
Fraud or No Fraud: The Unanswered Question in Chiarella v. United States, 9 OHio
N.U.L. REv. 75, 83 (1982) ("[Tlhe court concluded that the trading in Texas Gulf stock
by individuals aware of the undisclosed drilling results violated Rule 10b-5.").
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court noted that tippees who trade on inside information could
be equally as culpable as their insider source.50
The court in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 1 relied on the "possession test" announced in Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co. to conclude that tippees were subject to the
same disclose or abstain rule as traditional insiders. The tippees
in Shapiro were clients of Merrill Lynch who sold shares in a
company after being told by the insiders at Merrill Lynch that
the company's earnings were expected to decline. 5 The court
held both the nontrading insiders, who "tipped" the nonpublic
information, and their tippees liable for damages to purchasers
who acquired shares in the company during the period that the
tippees sold their shares.53 The court reasoned that since the
tippees "knew or should have known that the revised earnings
information came from a confidential corporate source and they
knew this information was nonpublic, they were under a disclos-
ure duty."5 4 Thus, the tippees violated the disclosure duty by
selling shares in a company with which they had no "special re-
lationship," because they acted with actual or constructive
knowledge that the information they received was nonpublic, in-
side information. 5
50. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 853. The issue of tippee liability was
subsequently confronted by the Commission in In re Investors Management Co., 44
S.E.C. 633 (1971). The Commission held that clients of Merrill Lynch violated Rule 10b-
5 when they sold their shares in a company due to a "tip" supplied by Merrill Lynch. Id.
at 647-48. The Commission reasoned that they acquired a Cady, Roberts duty when they
received material, nonpublic information. Id. at 641. Accord In re Faberge, Inc., 45
S.E.C. 249 (1973). This case involved "indirect tippees": persons who received the infor-
mation from a broker dealer firm as opposed to getting their information directly from
an insider. Id. at 256. Nevertheless, the Commission held that the obligations of indirect
tippees were "no less than those of the other parties merely because [they] did not re-
ceive the adverse information directly from [the insider)." Id. The Commission reasoned
that it was unnecessary to show that the parties occupied a "special relationship" or that
they "had actual knowledge that the information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary
duty." Id.
51. 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974). Accord Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 231-34.
53. Id. at 241. A private right of action to enforce § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is well
established. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971).
54. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 238.
55. Under the "possession test" developed in Texas Gulf Sulphur and Shapiro,
anyone in possession of inside information was under the same disclosure duty as tradi-
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Concerned with the expansive scope of its previous pro-
nouncement in Texas Gulf Sulphur," the Second Circuit, in
SEC v. Monarch Fund,5 7 attempted to limit the boundaries of
inside trading liability" by determining that not all "outsiders"
who trade while in possession of inside information can be de-
fined as "tippees." The Monarch court held that an investment
advisor who bought shares in a company after discovering from
an insider that institutional financing was imminent did not vio-
late Rule lOb-5.5' The court determined that the defendant was
an outsider, not a tippee, for purposes of Rule 10b-5 and, there-
fore, was not subject to a disclosure duty."
The Monarch court distinguished a "tippee" from an "out-
sider" by noting that unlike tippees, outsiders have no actual or
constructive knowledge that they are trading on inside informa-
tion and no special relationship with the company making them
tional insiders. Common law fiduciary principles became secondary to the principle that
inside trading was inherently unfair. Langevoort, supra note 26, at 10-11, contends:
[O]nce the law of insider trading was expanded to include tippees,. . . the "fidu-
ciary duty" source of the law was called into question. . . . While questions relat-
ing to the nature and the source of the duty and to whom it was owed remained
troubling, this was secondary to the desire clearly expressed in the securities laws:
to promote a fair and informed marketplace. Thus, the anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities laws were viewed as directly prohibiting unjust enrichment
resulting from an unshared informational advantage, regardless of the nature of
the relationship. The need to establish a duty in compliance with the require-
ments of common law fraud became subordinate to the desire to promote a fair
and informed marketplace.
Id.
56. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See supra notes 51-
52 and accompanying text.
57. 608 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1979). In Monarch, the SEC sought an injunction and
disgorgement of profits realized by selling securities after the inside information became
public because the defendant "knew or had reason to know that the information was
nonpublic and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation." Id. at 941. The
court held that there had been no inside trading violation because the defendant: (1) had
no reason to know that the information he received was confidential; (2) had no special,
confidential relationship with the company; and (3) the information lacked specificity.
Id. at 942-43.
58. The SEC initiated only 40 inside trading suits before 1978. The present rate of
suits is appoximately 20 per annum. See Seligman, An Economic Defense of Insider
Trading, FORTUNE, Sept. 5, 1983, at 47. This increased rate of litigation may be partially
responsible for the judicially perceived need to create clearer guidelines for ascertaining
insider liability. See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
59. SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d at 943.
60. Id. at 942-43.
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privy to its internal affairs.6" The court emphasized that an in-
vestment advisor's duty to his clients requires that he make in-
quiries to determine what securities have an "attractive invest-
ment potential. '62 Thus, the Monarch court was willing to
distinguish prior case law63 to maintain the role of investment
advisors at the risk of allowing individuals to profit from non-
public information."
4. Chiarella: The disclose or abstain duty restricted by the
boundaries of common law fraud
In Chiarella v. United States,65 the Supreme Court relied
on the common law concept of fraud to conclude that the duty
to disclose or abstain arises only if a fiduciary duty or other rela-
tionship of trust and confidence exists between the parties.
Chiarella, employed by a financial printer, was able to deduce
names of target companies by examining documents given to his
employer by the acquiring companies.6 6 Chiarella used this in-
formation to purchase stock in the target companies before the
tender offers had been publicly released.67 He was convicted of
violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he willfully failed
to inform the sellers of the target companies' securities of the
imminent takeover bids that would increase the value of their
stock."
61. Id. at 942.
62. Id. at 943.
63. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For a discussion of these two cases, see supra
notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
64. The Monarch court was concerned that affirming the lower court's conviction
would impose an "affirmative duty on advisers to verify whether or not their information
could be deemed public information." SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d at 943.
65. 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id.
68. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d
Cir. 1978), reu'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals "affirmed the conviction by holding that 'any-
one - corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material, nonpublic information
may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty
to disclose.'" Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 231 (quoting United States v.
Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1365).
Chiarella was convicted on 17 counts of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because he
1984]
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In reversing Chiarella's conviction, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that since Chiarella had no fiduciary or trust relation-
ship6 with the sellers of the target companies' securities, he was
under no duty to disclose or abstain from trading.70 While recog-
nizing that section 10(b) was intended as "a catchall provision,"
the Court insisted that "what it catches must be fraud. '71 Con-
sequently, the Court refused to extend liability for non-disclos-
ure of inside information on the sole basis of possession, since
"there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak. '7 2
The Chiarella Court did not directly confront the issue of
tippee liability, since Chiarella did not receive his information
from an insider.7 3 Nevertheless, in recognizing that the disclos-
ure duty has not been limited to traditional insiders, 4 the Court
noted that "[tlhe tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising
from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of fiduciary duty. ' 75 While this characterization suggests
received 17 letters confirming purchase of shares. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at
225 n.3. Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982),
sanctions criminal penalties against any person who willfully violates the Act.
69. The Chiarella Court was unclear as to what constituted a "special relationship."
In determining that Chiarella owed no duty to the sellers of the target companies' securi-
ties, the Court noted that Chiarella had no prior dealings with them and was not their
agent. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 232. The Chiarella Court distinguished its
earlier decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), by ex-
plaining that if the defendants in Affiliated Ute Citizens had acted merely as transfer
agents, no disclosure duty would have existed. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at
232. The Chiarella Court explained that because the bank in Affiliated Ute Citizens had
assumed a duty to act on behalf of the shareholders which the shareholders relied on, the
bank "could not act as market makers inducing the [shareholders] to sell their stock
without disclosing the existence of a more favorable ... market." Id. at 230. From this
analogy it appears that the Chiarella Court determined that the following factors consti-
tuted a "special relationship": prior dealings, the assumption of a duty to represent
shareholders' interests, and the shareholders' reliance.
70. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 234-35.
71. Id. at 235.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 231.
74. In explaining the development of the disclose or abstain rule, the Court recog-
nized several cases that did not limit the disclosure duty to traditional insiders. In Cady,
Roberts, the defendant was liable because he received non-public information from a
corporate issuer. Id. at 227 n.8. In Shapiro, the tippees were liable because they had a
duty not to profit from inside information that they knew, or should have known, came
from a corporate insider. Id. at 230 n.12. In Affiliated Ute Citizens, the defendants were
liable because they assumed a duty to act on behalf of the shareholders. Id. at 230.
75. Id. at 230 n.12.
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that a co-venture between the insider and the tippee plus a
breach of the insider's fiduciary duty may be prerequisites for
tippee liability,7 e the significance of this dicta7 was not clarified
until Dirks v. SEC.78
B. The Facts
Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who specialized
in advising institutional investors about the insurance indus-
try.7 ' In return for his advice, these investors would direct their
brokerage business through Dirks' firm.80 Secrist, a former of-
ficer of Equity Funding Corporation,8" told Dirks that the corpo-
ration's assets were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent
corporate practices.82 Secrist, the insider, urged Dirks, the tip-
76. Langevoort, supra note 26, at 28. Although Langevoort predicted the Supreme
Court's holding in Dirks, he concluded that "[a] reading [of the Chiarella footnote] that
requires the insider to benefit, however, would be unduly narrow." Id. at 29. Compare
this with Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 839 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1982), where the court inter-
preted footnote 12 In Chiarella as not requiring an insider's breach for tippee liability,
but noted that the concurring opinion in In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633,
645 (1971), suggested that a breach by the insider should be required to hold a tippee
liable.
77. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. This footnote was not inter-
preted by subsequent cases as requiring an insider's breach as a prerequisite for tippee
liability. See, e.g., Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982); Feldman v.
Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d 156, 165 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
78. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
79. "In 1973, Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer firm that specialized
in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional inves-
tors." Id. at 3258.
80. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 829.
81. "Secrist... had recently been fired from his job with Bankers National, a New
Jersey life insurance company that had been acquired by Equity Funding four years
earlier." Id.
The Supreme Court assumed that Secrist was an insider and did not address the
issue of the period of time that must elapse before an employee who has been fired loses
his status as an insider in the corporation where he previously worked.
82. Id. "Secrist had neither personal knowledge nor documentation to support any
of his charges . I." Id. at 830. Additionally, some of Secrist's charges eventually proved
false. Id.
Secrist reported his suspicions to New York insurance regulators on March 7, the
same day he contacted Dirks. Id. at 832 n.6. "They immediately assured themselves that
Equity Funding's New York subsidiary had sufficient assets to cover its outstanding poli-
cies and then passed on the information to California regulators who in turn informed
Illinois regulators." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3268 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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pee, to investigate and to publicly disclose the fraud."
During the following three weeks, Dirks corroborated the
credibility of Secrist's allegations by speaking with employees at
Equity Funding, who told him that the corporation's computer
files contained large blocks of bogus policies.8 4 Throughout his
investigation, Dirks urged The Wall Street Journal to publish
the story8" and continuously told investors about his suspi-
cions.86 Some of these investors succeeded in liquidating over
$16 million in Equity Funding securities before the company's
fraudulent practices were publicly disclosed.87 When the price of
Equity Funding stock fell from twenty-six dollars per share to
less than fifteen dollars per share, the New York Stock Ex-
change halted trading.8 8 On the same day, Dirks presented his
information to the SEC, which suspended trading on the follow-
ing day.8" Subsequently, the SEC filed a complaint against Eq-
83. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258.
84. Id. The first two phases of Dirks' investigation, examining publicly available
data and contacting people in the investment community, were generally fruitless. Dirks
also telephoned the chairman of Equity Funding, "who denied that there was any fraud
... and invited Dirks to visit the company's headquarters in Los Angeles." Dirks v.
SEC, 681 F.2d at 830. Dirks flew to Los Angeles and through his conversations with
corporate employees, he discovered the phony policies. Id. at 830-31.
85. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258. "On March 12, [Dirks] left a message for Herbert
Lawson, the San Francisco bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal. Not until March 19
and 20 did he call Lawson again, and outline the situation." Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
Dirks urged William Blundell, The Wall Street Journal's Los Angeles bureau chief,
to write the story. Blundell declined because he did not believe "that such a massive
fraud could go undetected . .. [and] feared that publishing such damaging hearsay
might be libelous." Id. at 3258.
86. Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "On March 12, eight days before Dirks
flew to Los Angeles to investigate Secrist's story, he reported the full allegations to Bos-
ton Company Institutional Investors, Inc., which on March 15 and 16 sold approximately
$1.2 million of Equity securities." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The investors whom
Dirks spoke to after March 20, the time by which he had substantially verified key por-
tions of Secrist's allegations, sold "approximately $15.5 million in Equity Funding stock
and $1 million in convertible debentures." Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 831.
87. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3258. Some of these investors promised Dirks a commission
in return for his information. Id. at 3258 n.2.
88. Id. at 3258. The initial halt in trading was prompted by Salomon Brothers who
"lodged a complaint of 'disorderliness' in the market for the stock." Dirks v. SEC, 681
F.2d at 832.
89. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 832. In addition to the insurance regulatory authori-
ties' knowledge of Equity Funding employees suspicions,
[a]s early as 1971, the SEC had received allegations of fraudulent accounting
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uity Funding, e" and The Wall Street Journal published the
story.9 1
The SEC charged Dirks and five of his institutional clients,
who sold their Equity Funding stock during Dirks' investigation,
with violating the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws." An administrative law judge imposed a censure' on four
institutions and suspended" Dirks from associating with any
registered broker-dealer for sixty days.9 5
On appeal, the Commission endorsed the Enforcement Divi-
sion's position that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5 by communicating
material inside information to third parties who were likely to
sell their stock in Equity Funding before the fraud was publicly
disclosed. 6 Accordingly, the Commission held97 that Dirks was
guilty of aiding and abetting violations of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933,"8 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
practices at Equity Funding. Moreover, on March 9, 1973, an official of the Cali-
fornia Insurance Department informed the SEC's regional office in Los Angeles of
Secrist's charges of fraud. Dirks himself voluntarily presented his information at
the SEC's regional office beginning on March 27.
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259 n.3.
90. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3259. As a result of the SEC complaint filed against the
corporation, 22 persons, including many corporate officers and directors, were indicted
and found guilty. Id. at 3259 n.4.
91. Id. at 3259. The front page story written by Blundell was based largely on infor-
mation assembled by Dirks. Id.
Blundell was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize for his story in The Wall Street Jour-
nal that exposed the scandal. Dirks became the object of a disciplinary proceeding. Dirks
v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 832.
92. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 832-33.
93. The SEC has the authority, under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (1982), to censure,
and to suspend for a maximum period of 12 months, any broker or person associated
with a broker, who violates the federal securities laws, if it is in the public interest.
94. Id.
95. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 833.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
17
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Act of 1934,1" and Rule 10b-5.100 In recognition of the important
role that Dirks played in exposing the massive fraud,'0 ' however,
the Commission reduced the sanction imposed on Dirks from
suspension to a censure.' 0 '
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia affirmed Dirks' conviction, endorsing the SEC's posi-
tion.03 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to define
the circumstances under which a tippee acquires the insider's
disclose or abstain duty.'04
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 13.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 14.
101. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 833. "Largely thanks to Dirks one of the most infa-
mous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed . Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at
3259 n.8 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 829).
102. "Censure is the mildest remedy available to the Commission in an administra-
tive proceeding; it imposes no restrictions on a respondent's activities." Brief of SEC in
Opposition at 2 n.1, Dirks, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available from U.S. Gov't Printing
Office, Pub. No. 383646-1144 (1982)).
Despite the fact that the SEC imposed no fines on Dirks, as a result of the Equity
Funding controversy, Dirks lost his $40,000 a year job. Dirks reported that he spent
$500,000 in legal fees since the litigation against him began in 1973. N.Y. Times, July 2,
1983, at 1, col. 1.
In an unrelated, subsequent action against Dirks, the SEC alleged that Dirks caused
securities to be sold pursuant to a materially misleading prospectus. SEC v. Scott, 565 F.
Supp. 1513, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The court found that Dirks violated the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws, but refused to issue an injunction "because of the SEC's
failure to establish a reasonable likelihood that he [would] commit future violations." Id.
at 1516.
103. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 846. The SEC's policy was that the selective dissemi-
nation of inside information to investors constituted a fraud, on the general investing
community. Id. at 834. The court of appeals reasoned that although Chiarella held that
a disclose or abstain duty could not be imposed absent a pre-existing fiduciary duty,
Chiarella did not hold that breach of the fiduciary obligations was a prerequisite for a
Rule lOb-5 violation. Id. at 838-39. Therefore, despite the fact that the insiders in Dirks
did not breach their fiduciary duty, id. at 838, Dirks inherited the insiders' fiduciary
duty and was subject to the disclose or abstain rule. Id. at 839.
Additionally, the court held that Dirks' position as an employee of a registered bro-
ker-dealer gave rise to an independent disclose or abstain duty. Id. at 840. Since the SEC
did not argue the merits of this theory, the Supreme Court did not address this "novel
theory." Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267 n.26.
104. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3260.
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III. The Decision
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Dirks v. SEC, 10 5
reaffirmed the principle set forth in Chiarella v. United
States'"e that the disclosure duty under section 10(b)107 arises
"from the existence of a fiduciary relationship" and not "from
the mere possession of nonpublic market information.' 08 The
Court rejected the SEC's theory that a tippee "inherits" the in-
sider's disclosure duty whenever he receives inside informa-
tion. 10 9 Instead, the Court reasoned that the tippee's disclosure
duty derives from the insider's fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers.110 The insider must breach his fiduciary duty and the tippee
must be aware of the insider's breach before a tippee acquires a
duty to disclose or abstain."'
The SEC attempted to distinguish the facts in Dirks from
those in Chiarella by noting that Chiarella was an outsider be-
cause he received information without the direct involvement of
an insider, while Dirks received his information from an in-
sider. 2 Thus, the SEC maintained, Dirks was a tippee and au-
tomatically "inherited" the insider's disclosure duty when he
knowingly received and benefited from the nonpublic
information.'"
The Court interpreted this theory of tippee liability as
"rooted in the idea that the anti-fraud provisions require equal
information among all traders"" ' and noted that the Court had
previously rejected this "equal information theory" in Chiarel-
la. 11 The majority in Dirks emphasized that the duty to disclose
105. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (6-3 decision).
106. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). For text of section 10(b) see supra note 13.
108. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 227-
35).
109. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62.
110. Id. at 3264.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 3262 n.15. For a discussion of the definition of an insider, see supra note
6.
113. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261-62.
114. Id. at 3262.
115. Id.
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or abstain does not arise from a mere duty to comply with the
general anti-fraud proscriptions in the federal securities laws. 16
To support this conclusion the Court explained that it had pre-
viously decided in Chiarella that "formulation of an absolute
equal information rule 'should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent.' "1117
The Court further justified its position by observing that
the adoption of the equal information theory in this case could
negatively affect market efficiency by inhibiting the role of mar-
ket analysts.""' It noted that Congress has exempted other mar-
ket professionals from similar statutory prohibitions because
they contribute to a "fair and orderly marketplace."1 9 There-
fore, the Court reasoned that the market analyst's contribution
should not be judicially inhibited absent clear congressional in-
tent. 20 Notwithstanding the need to insulate market analysts
from an overly broad interpretation of Rule 10b-5,"'1 the Court
recognized that "the need for a ban on some tippee trading is
clear.' 22 The Court explained that if the disclosure duty at-
tached only to insiders, the insiders could indirectly exploit
shareholders by tipping information to third parties. 2 3
Turning to the issue of how a tippee acquires the insider's
duty to disclose or abstain, the Court cited Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion in Chiarella to support the proposition that
the tippee's duty is derived from the insider's duty. 24 The Court
explained that the tippee's obligation arises "'from his role as a
participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary
duty.' ""5 An insider's disclosure duty, the Court reasoned, at-
taches to the tippee only when such information has been im-
properly supplied to the tippee.1 6 It concluded that the tippee
116. Id. at 3263.
117. Id. at 3262 n.16 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 233).
118. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263.
119. Id. at 3262 n.16.
120. Id. at 3262.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). For for the text of Rule lOb-5, see supra note 14.
122. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 3264.
125. Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12). See supra notes
73-78 and accompanying text.
126. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
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assumes a disclosure duty only when the insider has violated his
"Cady, Roberts duty" by breaching his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders."27 Consequently, a tippee acquires an insider's
duty to disclose or abstain only when the insider has breached
his fiduciary duty by supplying the information to the tippee
and the tippee is aware of this breach.12 8
According to the majority, there can be no tippee liability
"absent a breach by the insider."' 2 9 Therefore, the threshold
question in determining tippee liability is whether the insider
has breached his fiduciary duty. The Court stated that this test
depends primarily on the insider's purpose for supplying the in-
formation: "The test is whether the insider personally will bene-
fit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.' 30 This is a ques-
tion of fact.13 In determining whether the insider has received a
personal benefit from the disclosure, the majority directed
courts to "focus on objective criteria. . . such as pecuniary gain
or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earn-
ings."' " The relationship between the insider and the recipient
of the information may also give rise to the inference of a quid
pro quo transaction or an intention to benefit the recipient. 33
The majority added that the insider's breach is assumed when
the recipient is a relative or friend. 3 4
Before applying these guidelines to the facts in Dirks, the
Court addressed the issue of whether Dirks' guilt could be predi-
cated on grounds independent from his role as a tippee. The
Court gave the following reasons for concluding that Dirks' guilt
could not be based on any alternative theory arising from a fact
or relationship independent from his role as a tippee:
1. he had no pre-existing fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of Equity Funding;
2. he did not induce the shareholders or officers of Equity
Funding to repose their trust or confidence in him;
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3265.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 3266.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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3. Dirks' sources did not expect him to keep their informa-
tion in confidence;
4. he did not misappropriate or illegally obtain the
information. 5
Therefore, since Dirks' only legal obligation to disclose arose
from his status as a tippee, the Court concluded that he as-
sumed a duty to disclose only if the insiders breached their
fiduciary duty."'
Applying the "insider's personal gain test" to Secrist and
the other employees at Equity Funding, the Court determined
that they did not breach their fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers.'8 7 The Court maintained that the following facts and infer-
ences supported this determination: first, these insiders did not
receive any monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity
Funding's secrets; and second, their purpose was not to make a
gift of valuable information to Dirks.5 s Since these insiders did
not breach their fiduciary duty to the shareholders, no derivative
breach could be attributed to Dirks.5 9 Therefore, the insider's
duty to disclose or abstain did not attach to Dirks. Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that Dirks did not violate Rule
10b-5 by trading on material, nonpublic information. 40
B. Dissent
Justice Blackmun, 41 writing for the dissent, took issue with
the majority's introduction of a test that required a showing of
the "insider's improper purpose" as a prerequisite for establish-
ing a tippee's disclosure duty. 42 The dissent contended that lim-
iting tippee liability to instances where the insider is motivated
135. Id. at 3266-67.
136. Id. at 3267.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 3267-68.
139. Id. at 3268.
140. Id.
141. Justice Blackmun also wrote the dissent in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
142. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The device employed in
this case engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine. This
innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider's duty to sharehold-
ers if the insider does not act from a motive of personal gain." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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by an improper purpose is against legislative intent, 43 has no
basis in law,1 " and is against public policy.14 5
The dissent reasoned that since Secrist himself could not
trade on his inside information," he could "not do by proxy
what he was prohibited from doing personally."'14 According to
the dissent, Secrist allowed Dirks to disseminate information to
clients, who in turn dumped their stock, thereby exploiting un-
knowing purchasers. 148 Since Secrist's act resulted in injury to
the purchasers, 49 Secrist breached his fiduciary duty to them.'50
Dirks' knowledge of Secrist's breach made "him liable as a par-
ticipant in the breach after the fact.' 15'
The dissent rejected the majority's position that Secrist did
not breach his fiduciary duty because he was not motivated by
personal gain. The dissent contended that "[p]ersonal gain is
not an element of the breach of [insider] duty."' 52 To support
this conclusion, the dissent relied on Mosser v. Darrow,'"5 analo-
gizing the trustee relationship in Mosser to the relationship be-
tween an insider and shareholders.' 5 ' In Mosser, a trustee, who
143. Id. at 3268 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun notes the Supreme
Court trend "to limit the protections provided investors by § 10(b)." Id. at 3268 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). He concludes that "[tihis trend frustrates the congressional intent
that the securities laws be interpreted flexibly to protect investors." Id. at 3268 n.1
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accord Tomera v. Gath, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975).
"The fundamental purpose of section 10(b) is to achieve a high standard of business
ethics. This purpose is taken seriously and is broadly construed." Id. See also supra note
48 and accompanying text.
144. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The improper purpose
requirement ... has no basis in the law. .. ."). The dissent refers to the requirement
as imposing "a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty owed by insiders to
shareholders." Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority actually
rewards Dirks for his aiding and abetting).
146. Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The principle that an insider owes a fiduciary duty to stock purchasers, as well as to
sellers, was introduced in In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) and confirmed
in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8. For a further discussion of the impact
of In re Cady, Roberts, see supra note 42.
151. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
154. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3271-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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allowed his two employees to profit from their inside position,
was held liable to the estate for the personal gain that accrued
to his employees.'65 The dissent explained that the trustee in
Mosser breached his fiduciary duty despite the fact that his mo-
tives were selfless and he did not personally benefit from his em-
ployees' inside trading. 56 The dissent contended that under the
principle illustrated in Mosser, the motive of personal gain is not
essential to a trustee's liability.1 57 Instead, "the breach consists
of taking action disadvantageous to the person to whom one
owes a duty." 158 Therefore, the dissent reasoned that the breach
of an insider's duty, like the breach of a trustee's duty, results
from the consequences of the insider's actions, not from his mo-
tives.159 Applying this reasoning to the facts in Dirks, the dissent
concluded that Secrist breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders when he acted in a manner that injured them, regardless
of the fact that he was not motivated by an improper purpose. 6 '
The dissent contended that in addition to having no basis in
law, the majority's improper purpose requirement implicitly
rested on poor policy.16' It accused the majority of basing its de-
cision on the policy that "the end justifies the means": 62 the
general benefit achieved from Secrist's violating his duty to
shareholders outweighed the harm to those shareholders. 1 3 Al-
though the dissent considered Secrist's motive laudable, it took
issue with the means he chose to expose the fraud.16 4 Addition-
ally, the dissent argued that Dirks and his clients should not be
permitted to profit from inside information, since Dirks' failure
to report the fraud was unethical and against public policy.165
The majority opinion was criticized as being "deficient in policy
terms," because it rewarded Dirks for aiding and abetting.166
155. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. at 269-72.
156. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 3273 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun recognized that disclosure would have
been difficult in this case, and criticized the SEC because it
"tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade on
that information unless they disclose; [but] refuses . . . to tell
them how to disclose.116 7 Nevertheless, the dissent concluded
that Dirks and Secrist were under a duty to disclose or abstain,
and chided the majority for rewarding inside trading "by open-
ing a hole in the congressionally mandated prohibition on in-
sider trading."' '68
IV. Analysis
A. The Equal Information Theory
The majority in Dirks v. SEC e19 rejected the SEC theory of
tippee liability as being "rooted in the idea that the antifraud
provisions require equal information among all traders. 1 70 The
Dirks Court reaffirmed Chiarella v. United States'7 ' as repudi-
ating any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information
before trading,'712 and reiterated the conclusion announced in
Chiarella that the "information theory" should not be accepted
"absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent. 1 7 3
Although the rejection of the "equal information" theory is
consistent with the precedent established in Chiarella, the ma-
jority in Dirks appears to contradict itself in trying to reconcile
its rejection of the "equal information" theory with pre-Chiarel-
167. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
170. Id. at 3262.
171. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
172. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262.
173. Id. at 3262 n.16.
The "equal information" theory, as explained in Chiarella, proposed that inside
trading was fraudulent because such traders gained an unfair advantage over the less
informed. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 232. This broad theory would impose
inside trading liability on anyone who traded while in possession of material, nonpublic
information. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "pos-
session test." See also Heller, supra note 6, at 538-41. Chiarella explicitly rejected the
"equal information" theory by contending that "not every instance of financial unfair-
ness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
at 232. The Chiarella Court concluded that silence is not fraudulent absent a duty to
speak. Id. at 235.
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la case law.174 Initially, the majority stated that the fraud in an
inside trading case derives from the "'inherent unfairness in-
volved where one takes advantage' of 'information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose.' """ Subsequently, the
majority stated that the tippee's duty derives from the insider's
duty.1"6 If the fraud arising from inside trading derives from "in-
herent unfairness," it is difficult to rationalize why a tippee who
exploits shareholders by using inside information, does not com-
mit fraud absent a breach of duty by the insider. 7 7 The major-
ity's rejection of the "equal information" theory, however, can-
not be equated with a judicial endorsement of market behavior
that is "inherently unfair. 1 78 As the facts in Dirks illustrate, ju-
dicial adoption of the "equal information" theory would create
an imprecise proscription against any trading on nonpublic in-
174. Prior to Chiarella, cases that endorsed the "possession test" indicated a trend
toward adopting the "equal information" theory. See, e.g.,-Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that cases have
repeatedly held that the purpose behind § 10(b) is to protect all investors by promoting
full disclosure).
175. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3261 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936 (1968)). See supra note 52.
176. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
177. Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Chiarella that the "duty to abstain or
disclose arose, not merely as an incident of fiduciary responsibility, but as a result of the
'inherent unfairness' of turning secret information to account for personal profit."
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. The majority rejected the rule adopted by the SEC to impose inside trading
liability on Dirks because such a rule "would have no limiting principle." Dirks, 103 S.
Ct. at 3266. The Court noted that "[w]ithout legal limitations, market participants are
forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be
hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain." Id. at 3266 n.24 (emphasis added). The
majority suggests that without a "limiting principle," inside trading liability may be im-
posed in situations, such as the situation in Dirks, where the profit derived is not a
product of unjust enrichment, and thus, is not "inherently unfair."
Although the majority felt that Dirks' profit was not "inherently unfair," id., it ac-
knowledged that there may be "significant distinctions between actual legal obligations
and ethical ideals." Id. at 3264 n.21. Insofar as "inherent unfairness" can be equated
with unethical behavior, therefore, the majority implies that, without legislative clarifica-
tion, it will permit inside trading that is unfair, if there is no specific statutory or admin-
istrative proscription making such unfair behavior unlawful. See Freeman, The Insider
Trading Sanctions Bill - A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REV. 221 (1984). Addi-
tionally, the Chiarella Court stated that since financial unfairness does not necessarily
constitute fraud, not every case of inside trading that is "unfair" is made unlawful by §
10(b). Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 232.
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formation, even when such trading is not "inherently unfair," ''
and despite the fact that it actually promotes "market
efficiency.' ' 180
B. Market Efficiency
The majority's main concern with adopting a general dis-
closure duty was the inhibiting influence the adoption of such an
imprecise rule might have on the role of market analysts.118 As
the facts in Dirks illustrate, a market analyst who has im-
mediate financial incentives and a reputation at stake will often
uncover fraud before administrative agencies or the press.8 2
Without the analyst's investigatory efforts, corporate fraud
would continue to victimize investors.' Thus, the majority was
correct in concluding that rather than inhibiting market effi-
ciency, as the dissent contended,8 4 Dirks actually promoted an
efficient market by uncovering the fraud expeditiously.
The majority position was urged by the United States Gov-
ernment in an amicus brief in support of reversing Dirks' convic-
tion.""' The Government maintained that the "erroneous imposi-
tion of liability"' 6 in Dirks would lead to a situation where
"[f]ew analysts will be willing to devote substantial resources
179. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266 n.24. See also supra note 175.
180. The author of Rule 10b-5, Milton Freeman, in noting its broad application,
commented: "I tend to think that judges do not extend principles that do not- appeal to
their basic sense of fairness and equity." Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967). The majority decision indicates that the
facts of Dirks illustrated the unfairness and inequity in applying Rule 10b-5 to Dirks.
Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266 n.24. See supra note 178.
181. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.17.
182. Id. at 3259 n.8 (discussing the important role that Dirks played in expedi-
tiously uncovering the corporate fraud). Contra id. at 3273 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority for uncritically accepting Dirks' own view of the important
role he played in uncovering the fraud).
183. Id. at 3267 n.27. Even the lower court in Dirks recognized that construing Rule
10b-5 so as to prevent analysts from contacting employees and asking them about crimes
or frauds "may not, in the end, serve the public interest." Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824,
839 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
184. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3273 n.15, 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available Feb. 20, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
186. Id. See generally Fleischer, supra note 15, at 816 (discussing the "fairness ap-
proach," which would permit limited inside trading where the profit is not a product of
unjust enrichment).
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and expose themselves to personal danger ... if they are forbid-
den to utilize the information" until the investing public has
been fully apprised.18 7 Although opposed to the majority posi-
tion, the SEC also recognized the role of market analysts as be-
ing "necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."1 88
Further analysis of the consequences of the majority rule
serves to illustrate the soundness of the majority's and the Gov-
ernment's position. As the majority pointed out, the facts in
Dirks indicate no causal connection between "the inside trading
and the outsider's losses." 8 The dissent, however, argued in
favor of liability, focusing on the losses sustained by the
purchasing shareholders.190 Yet in light of the expeditious man-
ner in which Dirks' private efforts uncovered the fraud, there is,
as the majority contended, "little legal significance to the dis-
sent's argument that Secrist and Dirks created new 'victims' by
disclosing information to persons who traded."1 '' Although the
early disclosure caused by Dirks' efforts shifted the loss occas-
sioned by Equity's fraud to different parties, it served the public
interest by precluding injury to new victims, once trading in the
stock was halted.
The dissent criticized the majority for justifying Secrist's
and Dirks' actions on the theory that "the general benefit de-
rived . . . outweighed the harm caused to [the] shareholders. 1 9' 2
It argued that the majority's position was similar to the theory
that "insider trading should be permitted because it brings rele-
vant information to the market."'9 s According to the dissent,
failure to convict Dirks was "a disservice to this country's at-
tempt to provide fair and efficient capital markets."' 94 This con-
clusion fails to recognize that Dirks contributed to market effi-
187. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available Feb. 20, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
188. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.17. The majority concluded that due to the nature of
the securities market and the nature of analysts' information "such information cannot
be simultaneously available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public gener-
ally." Id. at 3263.
189. Id. at 3267 n.27.
190. Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 3267 n.27 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 3272-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 3273 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 4:631
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss3/5
DIRKS v. SEC
ciency by pursuing his investigation in a more zealous manner
than the administrative agencies and the press, who were also
privy to the allegations of corporate fraud.195 In addition, the
dissent failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that any bene-
fit Dirks received was largely a product of his own investigative
efforts, and thus was not inherently unfair. 9 '
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting
opinions reflects the tension between two purposes of the securi-
ties laws: a protective function aimed at ensuring public confi-
dence by eliminating disparities in information,197 and an effi-
ciency function aimed at "creating a flow of information which
will enable investment decisions systematically to reflect rele-
vant facts and expectations.' 98 The dissent's position reflected
the theory that because inside trading permits disparities in in-
formation, it destroys the public's confidence that all investors
have an equal chance to profit, thereby contributing to the pub-
lic's reluctance to invest in the stock market.'99 The majority, on
the other hand, emphasized the important role that analysts
play in bringing information to the public's attention, thereby
expediting the free flow of information to the public by prevent-
ing the available information from being "grossly inaccurate. '"200
The dissent attempted to distort the majority's "market ef-
ficiency" rationale in its accusation that by allowing tippees to
trade on inside information, the majority was effectively adopt-
ing an extreme position:2 ' all bans on inside trading should be
lifted.20 2 This accusation is unfounded. The majority opinion
195. See supra note 89.
196. See generally Fleischer, supra note 15, at 816 (discussion of the "fairness
approach").
197. Seligman, An Economic Defense of Insider Trading, FORTUNE, Sept. 5, 1983, at
47. As quoted in this article, John M. Fedders, head of the SEC's Enforcement Division,
equates the use of inside information with stealing and feels that a total ban is justified
due to "unfairness." Id. at 47-48.
198. Brudney, supra note 3, at 334. See also Heller, supra note 6, at 521.
199. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 3263 n.18.
201. Id. at 3273 n.14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 59-75, 93-
169 (1966). Manne contends that the SEC should not attempt to stop insider trading.
Instead, the prohibition should be left up to corporations who would be free to establish
their own procedures for monitoring the flow of information. The rationale for this radi-
cal position is that when insiders trade on their information, they make the market more
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cannot be construed as removing all restrictions on inside trad-
ing. 03 It leaves intact tippee liability when the insider breaches
his fiduciary duty, but protects the role of analysts by limiting
their potential inside trading liability to situations where the an-
alyst knows or should have known that the insider supplying
him with information was motivated by personal gain. 20' The
majority's position seeks to strike a balance between the two ex-
treme views: all inside trading is unfair and must be prohibited
because it destroys public confidence, and all inside trading
must be permitted because it enhances market efficiency.
C. The Insider's Personal Gain Test
Although the majority rejected the SEC's position that a
tippee automatically inherits the insider's disclosure duty205 be-
cause such a rule has "no limiting principle, ' 2 0 6 the majority rec-
ognized that "[t]he need for a ban on some tippee trading is
clear. '20 7 The Court observed that after Chiarella, it was unclear
how a tippee who has no special relationship with the sharehold-
ers acquires the insider's disclosure duty.2 0 8 Relying on Chiarel-
la, the majority noted that the tippee's obligation arises from his
role as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a
fiduciary duty and concluded that a tippee assumes the insider's
disclosure duty only when the tippee is aware that the insider
efficient because the price of stocks immediately adjust to changes in underlying reali-
ties. Outsiders, by noting the movement of the price of the stock, will therefore get a
better opportunity to judge the intrinsic value of the stock. In effect, Manne is saying
that since the SEC cannot effectively control insider trading, the public would benefit
from an end to the pretense that undisclosed information does not presently affect stock
prices by allowing all insiders to trade.
According to a recent article in Fortune, Manne's idea is endorsed by a growing
number of economists. Seligman, supra note 197, at 47. See also Friedman, Efficient
Market Theory and Rule 10b-5 Nondisclosure Claims: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 47
Mo. L. lav. 745 (1982).
203. Moreover, removing all restrictions on inside trading would not necessarily pro-
mote market efficiency, since an insider who could legally profit from nondisclosure
would have no incentive to make inside information public.
204. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
205. Id. at 3261.
206. Id. at 3266.
207. Id. at 3263.
208. Id. at 3261.
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has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 0 e The test
developed by the majority to determine when an insider has
breached his fiduciary duty is "whether the insider will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."110
The majority quoted In re Cady, Roberts & Co.211 out of
context when it interpreted Cady, Roberts as identifying the
standard for the majority's premise that a breach of duty largely
depends on "the purpose of the disclosure." 2 Cady, Roberts
merely reiterated that the purpose of the Exchange Act was to
eliminate the notion that exploiting inside information was a
"normal emolument of corporate office";21 3 it did not support
the majority's position that the insider's improper purpose was a
prerequisite for establishing tippee liability.21' On the contrary,
in Cady, Roberts the Commission held that the tippee violated
the disclosure duty despite their finding that the insider was not
motivated by an improper purpose.215
Moreover, while the majority's insistence that tippee liabil-
ity can be predicated only upon the tippee's knowledge of the
insider's breach is consistent with dicta from Chiarella,21 6 its
conclusion that a "breach of duty. . . depends in large part on
the purpose of the disclosure 2 17 goes beyond established fiduci-
ary principles, as the dissent emphatically pointed out. The dis-
sent contended that personal gain is not an element in determin-
ing an insider's breach and that therefore, the majority imposed
"a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the duty owed by
insiders to shareholders."218 The dissent correctly noted that
209. Id. at 3264.
210. Id. at 3265.
211. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
212. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
213. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912 n.15.
214. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265 (emphasis added).
215. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 917.
The Commission in Cady, Roberts found that the insider probably assumed that the
information he supplied to the tippee had already been publicly disseminated. Id. Apply-
ing the insider's personal gain test set forth in Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265, to the facts in
Cady, Roberts, one could conclude that there should have been no tippee liability in
Cady, Roberts since the insider was not motivated by an improper purpose.
216. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. For a discussion of this dicta in
Chiarella, see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
217. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3265.
218. Id. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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under the Mosser v. Darrow219 principle,220 the fact that the
trustee's motives were "completely selfless" was irrelevant to the
Court's determination that the trustee breached his fiduciary
duty.22 1 By analogizing a trustee's fiduciary duty to that of an
insider, the dissent observed that the insider's duty should be
addressed to the consequences that his actions have upon the
shareholders and not to the insider's motives. 222 Consequently,
the dissent's conclusion that Secrist breached his fiduciary duty
when he acted in a manner disadvantageous to the shareholders,
regardless of his motivation,223 is consistent with established
fiduciary principles, while the majority's insistence that there is
no breach unless the insider was motivated by the anticipation
of gain is inconsistent with these principles. 24
Despite the validity of the dissent's criticisms, to equate a
trustee with an insider is overly simplistic. Applying common
law fiduciary principles and precedents to modern securities
transactions involving corporate insiders is an anachronism. In
Mosser, the trust beneficiaries were readily identifiable and had
parity of interests.2 25 In contrast, when Secrist told Dirks about
the suspected fraud, as an insider he owed a duty to both pre-
sent and future Equity Funding shareholders. Unlike the situa-
tion in Mosser, these two groups had conflicting interests: the
present shareholders benefited by Secrist's attempt to expose
the fraud, while the investors who purchased shares from Dirks'
clients were injured. The dissent emphasized that Secrist
breached his duty by acting in a manner that injured prospec-
219. 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
220. Both the majority and the dissent cite Mosser as standing for the principle that
third parties who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach are as culpable as the
fiduciary. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263; id. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Mosser, the
Court held a trustee liable for breaching his fiduciary duty to the estate because he al-
lowed his employees to use their inside positions to the detriment of the trust. Mosser v.
Darrow, 341 U.S. at 275.
221. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Mosser v. Darrow,
341 U.S. at 275).
222. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224. Cf. supra note 41.
225. The Mosser Court explained that while the employees' dealing "did not di-
rectly extract any amount from the till of the trustee," Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. at
272, "the prohibition is not merely against injuring the estate - it is against profiting
out of the position of trust." Id. at 273.
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tive purchasers, 2 6 but ignored the fact that Secrist owed a duty
to present shareholders.2 2 Assuming, arguendo, that the dissent
was correct in stating that Secrist breached his fiduciary duty
regardless of his motivation, Secrist's action, while disadvanta-
geous to some investors, ultimately benefited the majority of the
people to whom Secrist owed a fiduciary duty.
The dissent's most valid criticism of the majority's imposi-
tion of an "insider's personal gain test" is that "the requirement
adds to the administrative and judicial burden in Rule 10b-5
cases."2 28 The majority conceded that this test will be difficult
for the courts to apply, but justified this added burden by as-
serting the need for a "guiding principle" to govern market ac-
tivities.22 9 The majority failed to recognize that because the test
it adopted will be difficult for the courts to apply, it will be a
less effective "guiding principle" for investors, who must now
determine whether using a "tip" constitutes a "personal gain" to
the insider who supplied the information.
From the guidelines set forth in Dirks, it appears that the
relationship between the insider and the tippee may be the de-
terminative factor in establishing the insider's gain. Where the
insider and tippee are unrelated, it appears that the insider
must receive a pecuniary or reputational benefit as a result of
the disclosure.23 Such a benefit, however, can be inferred where
the facts suggest a quid pro quo relationship. 231 Additionally, if
the tippee is a "friend" or "relative," the insider's gain is pre-
sumed.2 2 Under a broad interpretation of these guidelines, the
insider's personal gain appears to be a rebuttable presumption
once it can be established that the insider and the tippee are
friends, relatives, or have a mutually beneficial relationship. Al-
though the majority insisted that the insider's motivation can be
determined by objective criteria, the dissent correctly suggested
that under the test adopted by the majority, it remains unclear
226. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227. For a discussion on how the fiduciary relationship was expanded to include the
purchasers of securities, see supra note 42.
228. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3272 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 3266.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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whether Secrist breached his fiduciary duty. The majority stated
that an insider breaches his duty when he makes a gift of inside
information to a friend. 233 The dissent pointed out that "Secrist
surely gave Dirks a gift of the commissions that Dirks made on
the deal in order to induce him to disseminate the informa-
tion. '23 4 Additionally, one can argue that by exposing the fraud,
Secrist received "a reputational benefit that [would] translate
into future earnings.'235 Therefore, under a liberal interpreta-
tion of the personal gain test, Secrist breached his fiduciary
duty.
If courts take a broad view as to what constitutes a tipper's
personal benefit, insider liability may be imposed in the future
in situations similar to that in Dirks. Further administrative and
judicial explanation and refinement of the "personal gain" con-
cept must occur before the "insider's personal gain test" can be-
come the guiding principle the majority intended. Since the
guidelines set forth in Dirks are unclear, the majority opinion
actually raises more uncertainties than it resolves.
D. Unresolved Issues Raised by Dirks
The Dirks majority created a new category of insiders by
noting, in dicta, that under certain circumstances outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders and may be treated more
properly as tippers than as tippees2 36 Under this theory, recipi-
ents of inside information, such as underwriters, lawyers, and ac-
countants, who legitimately receive corporate information be-
cause of their working relationship with a corporation, are to be
considered insiders and not tippees2 7 They assume this "tem-
233. Id.
234. Id. at 3272 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Actually, the majority's criteria in-
dicates that a "gift" will be presumed only if the insider is a friend or relative of the
tippee. Id. at 3266. Under such a test, Dirks would inherit Secrist's duty if Secrist was
his "friend."
235. Id. at 3266.
Since Secrist had been fired by Equity Funding shortly before he communicated his
suspicion to Dirks (see supra note 81), he could be viewed as a spurned employee, who
sought to vindicate his own reputation by exposing Equity Funding's fraudulent
practices.
236. Id. at 3261 n.14.
237. Underwriters have previously been held liable for inside trading. See, e.g., Sha-
piro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d Cir. 1974)
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porary insider" status only if the corporation expects the non-
public information to remain confidential and their relationship
with the corporation suggests a duty of confidentiality.3
The language used by the majority suggests that the "mis-
appropriation theory" that was developed but left unresolved in
Chiarella2 3 9 may be adopted in the future. In determining that
Dirks had no disclosure duty independent from his role as a tip-
pee, the Court noted that Dirks did not "misappropriate or ille-
gally obtain the information about Equity Funding. '240 It can be
inferred from this reasoning that the misappropriation theory
may be a future basis for establishing a fiduciary duty.24' Under
the appropriate circumstances, the "temporary insider" the-
ory, 42 the "misappropriation" theory,4 or a combination of
(underwriter of corporate securities issues).
238. Two district courts, interpreting footnote 14 in Dirks, have used the phrase
"temporary insider" to establish a disclose or abstain duty under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
for persons who are not traditional insiders. SEC v. Musella, No. 83-342, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1984) (available Mar. 3, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file);
SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
The Mussella case involves an office manager of Sullivan & Cromwell who allegedly
told a variety of people of nonpublic takeover plans. Although the case is pending, the
court granted the SEC's request for a preliminary injunction barring two defendants
from future violations of §§ 10(b) and 14(e) and a temporary freeze on their profits alleg-
edly gained from the office manager's "tips" to them. The court reasoned that the office
manager could be viewed as a "temporary insider" because "Dirks gives Supreme Court
imprimatur to the notion that outsiders, under certain defined circumstances, may be-
come insiders with corollary fiduciary obligations." SEC v. Musella, No. 83-342, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1984).
In Lund, the court held the defendant liable under § 10(b) for trading on the basis
of information he learned because he was a source of potential funding for a corporate
venture. The court reasoned that the defendant became a "temporary insider" and as-
sumed an insider's disclose or abstain duty "by virtue of a special relationship with the
corporation." SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1403. But cf. Walton v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1980) ("temporary insider" status may not be applica-
ble where the parties deal at arms length).
239. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 243-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
240. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267.
241. The Second Circuit has used the "misappropriation" theory to impose Rule
lOb-5 liability. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). For a discussion of Newman and the "misappropriation"
theory, see Note, supra note 29.
242. See, e.g., SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1402-03. For a discussion of Lund, see
supra note 238. See also Fogelson & Stein, Inside Trading After 'Dirks', N.Y.L.J., Dec.
12, 1983, at 29, col. 3.
243. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16, 17.
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both24 4 may be used by the SEC and the courts as the basis of
establishing inside trading violations. Such an approach would
circumvent the necessity of establishing the "insider's personal
gain," a prerequisite for tippee liability.
The Court also failed to resolve numerous issues raised by
the nature of the information received by Dirks. Under the ra-
tionale in SEC v. Monarch Fund,2 45 Dirks' initial information
lacked the element of specificity necessary to constitute "mate-
rial facts."'24" The lower court in Dirks, however, considered the
fact that "some of Secrist's charges eventually proved false" to
be irrelevant and concluded that "by the end of Dirks' investiga-
tion there [was] no doubt that the information he possessed and
passed on to his clients had enough specificity to satisfy Rule
10b-5. ''247 The majority declined to clarify guidelines for deter-
mining when Secrist's unverified allegations reached the degree
of reliability to elevate them from the status of a "rumor" to
material, inside information.2 48 Even under the "equal informa-
tion" theory endorsed by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting
opinion in Chiarella,2 e the information obtained by Dirks could
not be considered inside information, since it was legally availa-
ble to the public. 250
The Court did not address28 1 the merit of the Solicitor Gen-
244. SEC v. Musella, No. 83-342, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1984) (available Mar. 3,
1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
245. 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979).
246. Id. at 942. In holding that the defendant's information lacked specificity the
Monarch court reasoned that "the ability of a court to find a violation ... diminishes in
proportion to the extent that the disclosed information is so general that the recipient
thereof is still 'undertaking a substantial economic risk that his tempting target will
prove to be a white elephant.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1366-67 (2d Cir. 1979)). See generally Heller, supra note 6, at 548.
247. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 843 n.24 (1982).
248. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266 n.25.
249. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 251 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I would
hold that persons having access to confidential material information that is not legally
available to others generally are prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to
exploit their structural informational advantage through trading in affected securities.").
250. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available Feb. 20, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file). The
Solicitor General argued that the information supplied to Dirks was not inside informa-
tion because it was "legally available to others" through the exercise of "diligence or
acumen." Id. (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 251, 252 n.2).
251. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3266 n.25.
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eral's contention that the information supplied to Dirks was evi-
dence of a crime and, therefore, could not be characterized as
"inside information. '252 The Solicitor General reasoned that
such information "is not the private property of anyone ...
[and] any effort to disseminate such information is encouraged
by law, while efforts to preserve its secrecy are strictly forbid-
den."2 53 Accordingly, the Solicitor General concluded that there
was no basis for viewing the "tips" supplied to Dirks as "im-
proper disclosure[s]" of" 'confidential' information or [as consti-
tuting] a breach of fiduciary duty." Therefore, under the theory
advanced by the Government, Dirks could not be characterized
"as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduci-
ary duty." 254
By adopting these alternative theories, the Court could
have declined to characterize the information supplied to Dirks
as "inside information," thereby avoiding the necessity for de-
veloping the "insider's personal gain test." Since this test will
undoubtedly prove to be difficult to enforce and may possibly
inhibit the SEC's ability to control inside trading, the Court
should have opted for one of these alternative theories to resolve
with the special problem presented by Dirks.
E. Evaluation
The "insider's personal gain test" developed in the Dirks
decision places an additional burden on the SEC in regulating
inside trading.2 5 Before Dirks, tippee liability could be estab-
252. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks, 103
S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (available Feb. 20, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Brief file).
253. Id.
254. Id. An effect of not classifying allegations of fraud as inside information, not
mentioned by the Solicitor General, would be to permit an insider, like Secrist, to law-
fully trade while in possession of such information.
255. Most instances of inside trading involve information legitimately obtained but
illegitimately used. Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Infor-
mation, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211, 224 (1980). Insofar as the insider's personal gain test set
forth in Dirks requires the SEC to prove that inside information has been illegitimately
obtained, it increases the enforcement burden on the SEC.
Even prior to the Chiarella and Dirks mandate, which requires the SEC to prove a
fiduciary or special relationship between the parties before imposing Rule lob-5 liability,
inside trading was ubiquitous. George Benston of the University of Rochester has ana-
lyzed the relationship between the price changes in securities and the publication of
SEC-required accounting data. He concluded that the corporate information contained
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lished by applying a three pronged test: first, the insider pos-
sessed material, nonpublic information; second, the insider com-
municated this information to a third party prior to its public
dissemination; and third, the tippee traded while in possession
of this information before it was publicly disclosed 256 As a result
of Dirks, the SEC has an additional burden. It must prove that
the insider personally benefited, directly or indirectly, by sup-
plying the tippee with inside information, and that the tippee
knew, or should have known, that the insider breached his
fiduciary duty.2 57
While the test developed in Dirks imposes a burden on SEC
enforcement, the practical impact of the decision will be limited
by the fact that few insiders are motivated to supply informa-
tion to third parties for reasons other than personal gain. Since
the test encompasses a variety of activities, courts will probably
define what constitutes an insider's "personal benefit" liberally.
In addition, the evidentiary burdens may be circumvented by
characterizing the recipient of inside information as a "tempo-
rary insider" as opposed to a tippee.258 Recognizing this poten-
tial, the SEC's General Counsel has expressed the opinion that
because the "temporary insider" theory creates the basis for new
enforcement approaches, Dirks represents a net gain for the
SEC's program to combat insider trading.2 59
Nevertheless, the Dirks decision raises the question as to
whether Congress should define what constitutes unlawful inside
in the data is almost invariably reflected in the price of the securities before the informa-
tion is published. Seligman, supra note 197, at 48.
Despite the SEC's increased efforts to enforce inside trading violations, the nature of
the offense makes discovery and the gathering of evidence complex and difficult. John M.
Fedders, enforcement chief of the SEC, explained: "'It's difficult to make the eviden-
tiary link from tipper to tippee to remote tippee. No one writes a memorandum about
insider trading. Instead of putting together pieces of paper, you're linking together the
circumstantial evidence of whispers.'" Market Leaks: Illegal Insider Trading Seems to
Be on Rise; Difficulty of Tracking Tips and Courts Hobble SEC, Wall St. J., Mar. 2,
1984, at 12, col. 5 (quoting John M. Fedders).
256. Dirks, 103 S.Ct. at 3262 (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n.42).
257. Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3264.
258. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
259. Fogelson & Stein, supra note 242, at 37 n.23 (citing address by DeGoelzer,
Alive and Well - S.E.C. Insider Trading Enforcement After Dirks, District of Columbia
Bar Ass'n, Sept. 28, 1983).
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trading. The proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act,260 which
provides for an increased civil penalty of up to three times the
profit gained or loss avoided as a result of an unlawful purchase
or sale of securities,261 suggests a legislative intent to facilitate
the SEC's increased effort to prevent insider trading viola-
tions. 262 The House passed the bill without defining insider trad-
ing, adopting the SEC's position that "if the Dirks decision is
properly and narrowly construed by the courts, the Commis-
sion's insider trading program will not be adversely affected.
263
There is some indication, however, that the Senate's version of
the bill may include a definition of insider trading.2 64 While pro-
posals to incorporate such a definition are based on legitimate
concerns, 265  a codified definition of insider trading, broad
enough to anticipate all the creative ways of using inside infor-
mation to exploit the public,6 6 would probably do little to clar-
ify the scope of insider trading liability. Viewed in this light, the
flexibility of the "insider's personal gain test" may prove more
260. H.R. 559, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
261. In addition, the bill would increase criminal fines for certain violations from
the current maximum of $10,000 to $100,000. Id.
262. The number of SEC actions alleging insider trading violations has steadily in-
creased from 6 actions in 1978 to 24 actions in 1983. Market Leaks: Illegal Insider Trad-
ing Seems to Be on Rise; Difficulty of Tracking Tips and Courts Hobble SEC, Wall St.
J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
263. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 14-15 (1983). The Committee relied
on an SEC report which reviewed 34 insider trading cases brought in the last two years
and found that only one of these cases may have been affected by the Dirks decision. Id.
at 15. Realizing that "the impact of Dirks depends on future judicial interpretations,"
the Committee directed the SEC to "monitor the effects of Dirks for at least two years
and report back to the Committee at the end of each year." Id.
264. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs subcommittee on securities which will propose its version of the Act, "would like
to incorporate in the Senate bill what the House bill lacks - a definition of insider trad-
ing broad enough to encompass accountants, lawyers, consultants and other 'outsiders.'"
Market Leaks: Illegal Insider Trading Seems to Be on Rise; Difficulty of Tracking Tips
and Courts Hobble SEC, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1984, at 12, col. 6.
265. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 178, at 222-23 (1984). Accord Block & Barton,
Securities Litigation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350, 367-68 (1979); Brodsky, Some Clarification
Needed on Who is an "Inside Trader", N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
266. The House Report declined to include a definition of insider trading in the
proposed legislation, agreeing with Arnold S. Jacobs who testified: "As with any broad
anti-fraud remedy, the fringes of what constitutes the prohibited act are occasionally
fuzzy. This, however, does not justify placing a definition in the bill; unscrupulous trad-
ers would skirt around any definition constructed." H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. at 13.
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advantageous than a legislative definition, since it enables ad-
ministrative and judicial tribunals to develop additional rules
and precedents as new situations arise.
V. Conclusion
Chiarella v. United States2 67 and Dirks v. SEC265 represent
the Supreme Court's most recent efforts to harmonize the
sweeping proscription embodied in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
with the policies of securities regulation and the variety of con-
duct encompassed by the letter of the law.26 " Deferring to the
policy in favor of promoting market efficiency, the Dirks Court
correctly concluded that tippee liability cannot be predicated on
the mere possession of inside information. Such a test, as Dirks
illustrates, would impose liability on a tippee who brings rele-
vant corporate information to the public, yet is not unjustly en-
riched by his possession of the information. The Court, there-
fore, achieved a just result and in doing so formulated a flexible
test to determine tippee liability.
In formulating the "insider's personal gain test," the Court
chose not to define what constitutes "personal gain." Given the
creative variety of schemes designed to exploit the public's igno-
rance of inside information, the test correctly enables adminis-
trative and judicial tribunals to adapt the test to prohibit con-
duct that is inherently unfair and in contravention of the
policies of the securities laws.
Yet this flexibility has its costs. By leaving to the lower
courts the task of defining what consitutes "personal gain" and
"improper purpose," the test fails to achieve the majority's ob-
jective: to develop a "guiding principle" by which tippee liability
can be gauged. Furthermore, by conditioning tippee liability on
the insider's breach of fiduciary duty, the "insider's personal
gain test" incorrectly bases tippee liability on the source of the
nonpublic information, instead of on whether the tippee has
267. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
268. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
269. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)
("We are dealing with a private cause of action which has been judicially found to exist,
and which will have to be delimited one way or another unless and until Congress ad-
dresses the question.").
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used an undeserved informational advantage to exploit the less
informed public.
Nevertheless, these weaknesses in the Dirks decision can be
overcome by the judiciary's use of the "temporary insider" the-
ory, suggested in dicta in Dirks, and the "misappropriation" the-
ory. These theories may counterbalance the potentially limiting
effect of Dirks on the scope of tippee liability.
Kathleen Donelli
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